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Nolm, LLC v. County of Clark, 100 P.3d 658 (Nev. 2004)1 
CONTRACTS – PROPERTY DEEDS 
Summary 
 Clark County (“the County”) wanted to sell the remnants of two parcels of land 
after finishing constructing five lanes at the Desert Inn Arterial.  The combined acreage 
of the two parcels totaled .49 acres. 
 At a public auction, the County advertised the land under the former legal 
description, which described the property as being .92 acres.  Neil Ohriner, the sole 
owner of Nolm, LLC, realized the legal property description was incorrect.  He then bid 
on the parcels, winning them for $340,000.00.  The Grant, Bargain, and Sale Deed 
delivered to escrow likewise incorrectly described the property as .92 acres.  After 
escrow closed, Ohriner subsequently transferred the deed to Nolm. 
 After the sale, the County taxed Ohriner $1,050,480.00 on one parcel and 
$81,310.00 on the other, taxes based on the full .92 acres.  When Ohriner brought the 
issue of the tax amounts to the County’s attention, he was given two options:  either 
voluntarily reform the deed to describe the appropriate parcel sizes, or rescind the entire 
contract for the full purchase price plus taxes.  Ohriner instead filed a complaint against 
the County for trespass, inverse condemnation, and private nuisance.  The County filed a 
counter-suit, seeking reformation of the deed, or rescission of the contract, plus attorney’s 
fees and costs. 
 The district court considered the fact that although Ohriner was aware before 
purchasing the property that the legal description was incorrect, he intended to use the 
County’s error as a “bargaining chip” if the County opposed his application for an adult 
use permit for the property.  The district court ordered Ohriner to reform the contract to 
reflect the true legal description of the property, .49 acres.  Ohriner filed a motion for 
reconsideration and clarification, arguing that the purchase price and property taxes 
should have been abated.  His motion was denied, after which Ohriner filed an appeal.   
Issue and Disposition 
Issue 
 Can a property deed be reformed in favor of a unilaterally mistaken seller who 
bears the risk of mistake, when the buyer was aware of the mistake and sought to use it 
against the mistaken party? 
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Disposition 
 Yes.  The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court decision reforming a 
land sale contract where one party makes a unilateral mistake that is known to the 
opposing party and where the opposing party deliberately does not bring it to the 
mistaken party’s attention.   
Commentary 
State of the Law Prior to Nolm 
 Although it is a case of first impression in Nevada, the Nolm decision follows 
similar holdings of courts in the majority of western states.  In addition, the Nevada 
Supreme Court’s holding is also in accord with the applicable provisions of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.2   
Other Jurisdictions 
 The court notes that most of the western states allow for reformation of a writing 
where one party makes a unilateral mistake and a party with knowledge of the mistake 
fails to make the other party aware.3  More specifically, the court examines the principles 
outlined in several cases regarding the reformation of a contract: equity, gross negligence, 
and intent.  
In an Oregon case, two parties contracted for the sale of real property, having 
formalized the contract terms in a letter.4  Thereafter, one party prepared a formal writing 
in which the contract terms were different than those outlined in the antecedent letter.  
The drafting party knew that the new terms were different, knew that the other party 
could not speak English, and knew that the contracting party relied on the representations 
of the drafting party as to the contents of the contract.  The drafting party, however, did 
not disclose the new terms.  Owing to these circumstances, the Oregon court held that the 
drafting party’s conduct was inequitable and that the contracting party’s mistake was not 
the result of gross negligence.5  
                                                
2 With regard to the reformation of a writing to express the terms of the agreement as asserted, the court 
turned to the commentary in section 166 of the RESTATEMENT which allows reformation when one party is 
mistaken and the other party, aware of the mistake, remains silent.  The party’s silence then becomes an 
assertion that the writing is as the other understands it to be.  Similarly, section 161 of the RESTATEMENT 
provides that a party’s silence regarding a fact is tantamount to a declaration that the fact did not exist.     
3 Jones v. Reliable Sec., Inc., 29 Kan. App. 2d 617, 28 P.3d 1051, 1062 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (written 
instrument may be reformed where there is ignorance or mistake on one side and fraud or inequitable 
conduct on the other); Oftedal v. State ex rel. Transp. Com'n, 308 Mont. 50, 40 P.3d 349, 352, 359 (Mont. 
2002) (allowed reformation of a contract where a contractor had underbid by such an amount that the other 
party was on notice of the mistaken bid); Diamond v. Granite Falls School Dist., 117 Wn. App. 157, 70 
P.3d 966, 971 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (where the school district knew of appellant's mistake when the 
parties entered into a contract, the trial court should have relieved appellant from its unilateral mistake).  
4 Kish v. Kustura, 190 Ore. App 458, 79 P.3d 337 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).   
5 Id. at 465.   
In the case at bar, Ohriner admitted that he knew of the County’s error in listing 
the parcels as .92 acres, but remained silent nevertheless.  He hoped to take advantage of 
the County’s error.  Like the party in the Oregon case, Ohriner’s conduct was inequitable.   
The County was not grossly negligent in that the land sale was the result of 
multiple inter-governmental departments attempting to coordinate the transaction.  The 
court sides with the County government asserting that the County department ultimately 
responsible for the sale was one which had never before conducted such sales.  Mere 
miscommunication between inter-governmental departments, therefore, is not gross 
negligence.   
The intent of the parties to a contract is also an essential element in the case at 
hand.  In Belk v. Martin6,  the Idaho Supreme Court upheld a ruling to reform a lease in 
which a typographical error, known to one party but not the other, required the payment 
of ten times the agreed upon lease amount.   
In the present action, the County only intended to sell the remnant parcels, but 
Ohriner, like the knowledgeable party in Belk, knew about the written error but failed to 
bring it to the opposite party’s attention.   
Effect of Nolm on Current Law 
 The law clearly favors a party without knowledge of a mistake in a contract where 
the other party has knowledge of the mistake and plans to use it to their benefit in the 
future.     
Conclusion 
 Where one party is aware of a unilateral mistake in the formation of a contract, 
and where they deliberately do not notify the other party of the mistake, it is within the 
power of Nevada courts to reform the contract.  The court must take into account 
elements such as the intent of the parties, whether the knowledge of the mistake places 
one party in an inequitable position in comparison to the other, and whether a party’s lack 
of knowledge as to the mistake is due to gross negligence. 
                                                
6 136 Idaho 652, 39 P.3d 592, 599 (Idaho 2001).   
